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Abstract
The information contained in social systems, and the part of it that animals actually possess,
is a driver of the evolution of sociality, cognition, and animal culture. However, it is difficult
to detect how much information individuals actually have about their social worlds. Even when
information can be detected, differences in methodology make cross-species comparisons difficult.
We present a new method for detecting social information in dominance hierarchies, that infers
individual-level rules for aggression based on how aggression decisions are influenced by differences
in social rank between an individual and potential opponents. We apply this method to a cross-
species comparison of 172 social groups across 85 species in 22 orders. By looking for heuristics
that depend upon rank information, we can back-infer the types of information individuals possess
about the macro-level properties of their group. Summary measures of these heuristics then place
groups within a taxonomy, providing a biologically-relevant “social assay” to quantify the amount
of social information within groups and to identify consensus strategies at the group level. We find
the majority of animal groups in our dataset (112 groups, 65%) follow a downward heuristic to
structure their fights, spreading aggression relatively equally across lower-ranked opponents. An
additional 50 groups (29%) use strategies that are indicative of more detailed rank information.
Strategies are not phylogenetically constrained and different groups within the same species can
use different strategies, indicating that the choice of heuristics may be contextual and that the
structuring of aggression by social information should not be considered a fixed characteristic of
a species. Instead, individuals may be able to plastically respond to changes in environmental
or social conditions by increasing or decreasing the complexity of their strategies. Our approach
provides new opportunities to study the use of social information across species and the evolution
of social complexity and cognition.
Keywords: Animal sociality, animal conflict, dominance hierarchy, heuristics, self-organizing sys-
tem, social cognition, social feedback, social complexity
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Significance
What animals “know” about their social worlds is hard to quantify but critical to the evolution of
sociality and cognition. We present a method that can infer the extent to which individuals know
their social standing in a group, and use this information to direct their actions. We apply our
method to data on animal conflict in 85 species to reveal how species choose their fights based on
information about rank. This “social assay’ allows us to classify the social strategies of different
groups. A major result is the role of context: different groups of the same species can have
radically different levels of strategic sophistication. Our work connects sociality with information
more explicitly than previously possible, provides new possibilities for comparative analyses, and
opens new avenues for socio-cognitive and information-based research in both animals and humans.
Introduction
Biologists have long been interested in within-group conflict and dominance hierarchies [1–7]. These
forms of structured aggression have attracted research attention because they are taxonomically
widespread across the animal kingdom [5, 8, 9], biologically relevant to individuals within social
groups [10, 11], and strikingly similar in basic structure even across very different species [12].
This surface-level similarity makes the aggression networks underlying hierarchies one of the most
promising kind of social network for comparative analyses across a wide range of species and social
systems.
However, aggression does more than construct and maintain dominance hierarchies. It is also
possible for the dominance hierarchy itself to play a critical role in conflict in a top-down fashion.
Individuals gain and lose rank through the strategies they use to direct aggression, but those
strategies may be critically informed by the ranks themselves. As we shall show, in many animal
groups, summary statistics on the individual level reveal the predictive power of rank. In many
species, relative rank can determine who individuals choose to aggress and how they allocate that
aggression.
The connection between rank and behavior suggests the existence of a feedback loop between
individual actions and social information about the group as a whole [13]. This feedback loop is
closed when individual-level decisions can either modify or stabilize the very group-level information
that guides them. These decisions can be informed by relevant social information, which may be
encoded in the spatial patterning of individuals (e.g. [14]), observable signals or characteristics
of individuals (e.g. [15]), information an individual has about its own abilities (e.g. [16]), or the
relationships it has with others (e.g. [17]). Given the complexity of quantifying the full structure
of the dominance hierarchy, we expect individuals to rely on simpler rules that require neither
full information nor fully optimized strategies. In the literature on judgment and decision-making
in humans, where these simpler rules are known as heuristics [18, 19]. The use of heuristics is
now understood to be a major factor that structures human social behavior and decision making.
Characterization of these heuristics and the advantages and disadvantages of their use has allowed
economists and psychologists to explain previously mystifying features of human behavior (e.g.,
[20, 21]).
Here, we apply these two ideas—of feedback loops which create information about rank and of the
heuristics which indicate how animals use this information—to empirical data on animal dominance
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hierarchies. We present a method to detect the presence and use of information in animal groups,
and apply observations of fighting and dominance interactions within 172 independent social groups
across 85 species in 22 orders using a large empirical dataset [12, 17].
Previous research has shown that aggression networks underlying dominance hierarchies in species
across the phylogenetic tree are remarkably similar when decomposed into basic network motifs [22].
Here, we take the opposite approach, focusing on ways in which an individual acts towards others
that are contingent of larger-scale social information about rank. We present two measures to
quantify the extent to which decision-making is guided by rank. Focus quantifies the extent to
which individuals direct their aggression on the basis of differences in relative rank. Position
quantifies the relative rank differences at which aggression is most focused, allows us to distinguish
different rank-informed strategies individuals might be using when information about rank is used.
These two measures provide a social assay that can detect how much information the social system
contains about relative rank differences and how individuals use this information about themselves
and their potential opponents to structure their observed behavior, regardless of how that informa-
tion is encoded. We use focus and position to delineate three conflict heuristics that are informed
by different types of information about rank: (1) the downward heuristic, where individuals aggress
equally against all lower-ranked individuals; (2) close competitors, where individuals aggress pref-
erentially towards those just below themselves in rank; and (3) bullying, where individuals aggress
preferentially towards those ranked far below themselves in rank. Each strategy allows individuals
to preferentially engage with a certain subset of others based on different types of information about
the relative rank difference between themselves and potential opponents. The use of a particular
strategy allows us to back-infer the type of information individuals must have in order to use the
strategies that they do.
Combined, our new quantitative methods, our model-fitting procedure, and our detection of so-
cial rules governing aggression decisions within hierarchies provides new insight into how animals
structure their social relationships and how they make biologically-relevant social decisions.
Methods
Empirical data sources
We used a large empirical dataset of aggression and dominance hierarchies that is openly accessible
([12], Dryad doi: https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.f76f2). We excluded two groups due to
apparent errors in the presentation of data in the original papers (Table 4, Nest 39 in [23] and
Table 3 in [24]). We supplemented this dataset with data from aggression and rank in monk
parakeets ([17], Dryad doi: https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.p56q7, data from study quarters
2-4 for groups 1 and 2).
These datasets contain the number of times each individual “won” against each other individual.
These “wins” could be the outcome of aggressive contests, show the directionality of aggressive
events, or indicate a submission display towards a dominant individual. They do not have informa-
tion on which individual started a fight, only the outcome of the interaction. We use the general
term “aggress” to describe the actions individuals take in these datasets, and focus here on the
perspective of the winners as initiators of aggression, although all of our analyses apply equally
well to cases where the initiator of the fight chooses to start a fight that it ultimately loses.
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Rank and distribution of aggression
For each group, we find individual ranks using a modified version of eigenvector centrality (see SI).
In particular, we compute the probability that each individual aggresses with each other individual,
and then add a small regularization term,  (see SI for a Bayesian calculation of the optimal value
of this term); the eigenvector centrality of the resulting matrix allows us to extract the relative
ranks of individuals that are implicit in the patterns of aggression [25].
Plotting the overall distribution of real aggression in each group by relative rank differences enables
us to determine whether the distribution of aggression is structured by rank differences among
individuals, whether individuals in the group focus their aggression on a subset of individuals
based on relative rank differences, and where in relative rank distance space aggression is focused.
Our two measures are focus and position. We compare their values quantified from real-world
data with those generated from a set of different agent-based models which allows us to determine
minimal models for group-level aggression strategies used in a particular group.
Calculating focus
A group’s focus is is high when individuals strongly concentrate their aggression towards opponents
with a particular range of relative rank differences; it is low when aggression is spread across the
entire group. Aggressive events in a group are summarized by the aggression matrix A, whose
elements Aij count the number of times individual i aggressed against individual j.
To define focus we first construct the relative-aggression distribution, R(∆), which measures the
level of aggression between individuals separated by ∆ steps in relative rank. If we define P∆ as
the set of all pairs {i, j} where i is ∆ ranks above j, then R is defined as
R(∆) =
1
|P∆|
∑
i,j∈P∆
Aij , (1)
where |P∆| is the total number of pairs in the set. R(∆) is the average amount of aggression
directed ∆ rank-steps away. When ∆ is positive, R(∆) measures the average aggression directed
‘down’ the hierarchy, from a higher-ranked individual to a lower-ranked individual.
In other words, R(∆) is a measure of the fraction of events that are directed between individuals
separated by ∆ steps in relative rank, given the total aggression in the system that could have been
directed ∆ steps away. A plot of R(∆) as a function of ∆ tells us a great deal about the flows of
aggression through the system. Fig. 1 provides an example; most aggression is directed “down” the
hierarchy towards lower-ranked individuals (positive ∆), although in Fig. 1b and c, aggression is
more widely distributed than Fig. 1a, indicating that in these systems, more aggressive events are
directed “up” the hierarchy (negative ∆).
Focus, F , is defined as how “sharp” this distribution is:
F = 1− Var(R)
N(2N − 1)/6 , (2)
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Figure 1: Distribution of aggression of real groups showing how patterns are consistent with
(panel a) or diverge from (panels b and c) patterns of aggression artificially generated by the
downward heuristic. Panels show data from (a) mule deer [26], where the real aggression followed
the downward heuristic, (b) monk parakeet [17], where real aggression followed a close competitor
pattern, and (c) vervet monkey [27], where real aggression followed a bullying pattern. Shading
around lines indicates 95% confidence intervals.
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where Var(R) is the R(∆)-weighted variance of ∆,
Var(R) =
∑N−1
∆=−(N−1)(∆− ∆¯)2R(∆)∑N−1
∆=−(N−1)R(∆)
(3)
and ∆¯ is the R(∆)-weighted mean of ∆,
∆¯ =
∑N−1
∆=−(N−1) ∆R(∆)∑N−1
∆=−(N−1)R(∆)
(4)
The normalization term (2N − 1)N/6 is chosen so that a uniform (flat) distribution of aggression,
i.e., “rank ignorant”, gives a focus of zero. If focusing is very strong—e.g., if all individuals direct
their aggression towards the individual two ranks down from them in the hierarchy, F is 1. As
aggression is more evenly distributed, F decreases. In the case that aggression is completely uniform
across all ranks, then the normalization is chosen such that F will be precisely zero. (In rare cases,
where the aggression is “overdispersed”, it is possible to have negative focus.)
Position of focused aggression
If rank information is present and is used, and we can detect this via focus, then knowing the
position of the peak of aggression gives us information about the specific relative rank-based strategy
that individuals are using. For example, individuals with focused aggression could direct most
of their aggression towards those that are ranked directly beneath themselves in the hierarchy.
Alternatively, individuals could focus their aggression on the very lowest ranked individuals in
the group. These two cases could result in similar levels of focus in aggression, but could be
differentiated from each other by differences in their position values. In the first case, position would
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be closer to each individual’s own rank (and closer to 0) while in the second case, position would
move towards 1 as aggression is directed at individuals many ranks distant from an individual’s
own rank.
We define the position of focused aggression as the average of the distribution of normalized aggres-
sion for each social group; i.e., for each individual, we compute the probability that the individual’s
aggression is directed at an individual rank ∆ away, Pi(∆), and then average these probabilities
over all individuals, formally,
P =
N∑
i=1
∑
∆∈O(i)
∆Pi(∆), (5)
where O(i) is the list of relative ranks available to individual i; higher-ranked individuals have more
relative ranks available downward (positive ∆), while lower-ranked individuals have more available
up.
The P measure accounts for the effects of both individual aggression levels and the number of
potential aggressive targets as a function of rank, and allows us to capture the extent to which
decision-making on the individual level is sensitive to relative rank position.
Modelling the structural rules of dominance hierarchies
The simplest rank-based rule governing aggression in a hierarchy is a rule we term the “downward
heuristic”. Here, individuals aggress only against those ranked below themselves, and lose against
all those ranked above. This is the simplest rank-based rule because individuals follow a binary
decision rule: aggress towards those of lower ranks and avoid those with higher ranks; in essence,
individuals perfectly follow the most basic structure of the dominance hierarchy.
We use this simple rule to recreate aggression patterns for each group, and compare it with the real
observed aggression patterns. We do this using an ensemble of agent-based model simulations to
create a set of artificial aggression networks. These models preserve some of the real data structure
while permuting other aspects. We used these artificial aggression networks to determine which
values of focus and position we should expect to be generated if animals in the group were only
using this basic downward heuristic.
We use each individual’s rank, calculated from the real dataset, and then allow individuals to aggress
as much as they do in the real data, but change who they fight against. In the pure downward
heuristic case, individuals fight randomly but only with individuals ranked below themselves in
the hierarchy. This process allowed us to remodel the real data at the event level. This process
is consistent with recent best practice recommendations for network permutation, which supports
event-level permutations of social interactions rather than relationship strengths [28].
Formally, given the aggression matrix Aij , and the ranks ri. The first-ranked individual, k, has rk
equal to one, and ri > rj indicates that i is lower ranked than j. Then, for each individual i, the
row Aij is then mapped to A
′
ij where
A′ij =
∑N
j=1Aij
N − ri + 1δrj>ri , (6)
and δrj>ri is equal to one when the subscript is true (i.e., when then j is lower ranked than i) and
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Figure 2: Examples of strategy assignment to (a) downward heuristic (mule deer, [26]), (b) pure
close competitors (monk parakeet, [30]), and (c) pure bullying (vervet monkey, [27]). Diamond
points show real focus and position values for each group (± 1SD). White points indicate focus
and position values (± 1SD) of artificial dataset generated with agent-based models including 0%
(upper right) to 100% (lower left) randomly directed events.
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zero otherwise. This mapping takes the total aggression by individual i and distributes it equally
towards all lower-ranked individuals.
Due to mistakes by the individuals, real systems may be somewhat noisy and may not follow a pure
downward heuristic. To account for this, we introduced the possibility of randomness in aggression
direction; mathematically, we allow for an  probability that the individual simply directs aggression
at a random individual,
A′ij; = (1− )A′ij +
δi 6=j
N − 1 . (7)
We conducted a parameter sweep of the downward aggression heuristic in , gradually increasing
the amount of randomly-directed aggression from  equal to zero (perfect downward aggression) to
unity (completely random behavior), then examined how increasing randomness affected focus and
position values.
Fig. 1 shows the effect of replacing the actual aggression patterns with aggression artificially gen-
erated by the downward heuristic; as can be seen, non-zero aggression (R(∆) positive) is now
(almost) entirely found at positive ∆. (A small amount of upwards aggression persists, because the
rank orders (ri) are measured on the original data, and that order changes slightly when the rule
is enforced.)
Assignment of Heuristics
Our artificial aggression networks generated by the downward heuristic serve as randomized refer-
ence models [29] to which we can compare the real observed datasets, and as a form of null model
for the downward heuristic: we fail to reject the downward heuristic as a plausible generating rule
of focus and position in the real datasets if the real focus and position values fall within the range
that can be produced by our artificial data. For real groups that fall outside of the region that
could be generated by the downward heuristic, we categorize these groups into strategies other than
the basic downward heuristic.
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We categorized groups into four aggression strategy types: downward heuristic, close competitors,
bullying, and undefined. We ran agent-based models of aggression under the downward heuristic
strategy, and scanned across values of  from zero (perfect use of rank information) to one (com-
pletely random behavior). This then enabled us to delineate the focus and position parameter space
in which these summary measures are consistent with those produced by the downward heuristic.
We drew a polygon around the space traced out by different values of , using the extremes of
error bars to set the edges of the polygon (Fig. 2). Real data that intersected this downward
heuristic polygon were scored as consistent with that model if any of the error bars for the real
data overlapped with the polygon (Fig. 2a). Fig. 2 provides an example of these assignments; the
same value of focus and position may be categorized as “close competitors” in some groups and
“downward heuristic” in others, because larger group sizes may provide additional signal-to-noise
for null rejection.
We defined the close competitors strategy as having a lower position value than that produced
by the downward heuristic model (i.e. aggression focused more towards near-ranked individuals,
Fig. 2b) and bullying as having a higher position value than the modelled data (i.e. aggression
focused more towards the bottom of the hierarchy, Fig. 2c). The undefined strategy groups had
focus values lower than those expected in fully random systems. Real data that were fully contained
within the polygon space of the close competitors, bullying, or undefined strategies were scored as
“pure” for that strategy. Real data with 3 error bars falling within a single strategy were categorized
as “mostly” close competitors, bullying, or undefined.
We also used the downward heuristic agent-based models to determine the likely level of hierarchical
structuring in the real datasets. We determined the extent to which focus values were affected by
increasing the amount of randomly directed events in the artificial downward heuristic data.
Phylogenetic analyses
We downloaded a time-calibrated phylogeny for all resolved species in our dataset from the Timetree
of Life (www.timetree.org, [31, 32]). This included 79 species of the 84 for which we had social
data (in some cases, we made an isomorphic substitution when the original species was not found
in the Timetree database). We used the R package geiger with our three types of discrete social
strategies (downward heuristic, close competitor, and bullying) to fit a discrete trait with equal
evolutionary rate. We tested for phylogenetic signal using Pagel’s λ and a chi-squared likelihood
test of significance for each social strategy. We visualized trait evolution using an ancestral state
reconstruction for the presence or absence of each strategy.
Code to enable running the analyses will be released in an R package, on publication of the paper.
Results
Structured aggression
Most of the animal social groups in the empirical dataset had well-structured dominance hierarchies.
Groups generally had real focus values consistent with low levels of randomly-directed aggression:
39% of groups (N = 67) were most similar to modelled data with 10% or less randomly-directed
events ( ≤ 0.1); 72% of groups (N = 124) were most similar to modelled data with 30% or less
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randomly-directed events ( ≤ 0.3). Only 20 groups (12%) had focus values most similar to modelled
data with 80% or greater randomly-directed events ( ≥ 0.8); of these, none were categorized as a
pure close competitor or pure bully strategy type. Only 12 groups (7%) had focus values closest to
modelled data with totally random aggression, which corresponds roughly to previous results with
this dataset which found over-representation of transitive configurations, an indication of structured
hierarchies, in all but 3% of groups [12].
Focus and position
Simulated data generated with an agent-based model base on the downward heuristic had mean
focus of 0.79 (range 0.67 to 0.93) and mean position of 0.42 (range 0.3 to 0.48). In these simulations,
as expected, high focus was generated when randomness was low. Focus values in these artificially-
generated datasets responded strongly to the amount of randomly-directed events included in the
rule, with a strong negative relationship between the amount of randomly-directed aggression events
in our modelled data and the resulting value of focus (mean correlation −0.98, range −1 to −0.82,
all p-values < 10−5).
Real focus and position values in our empirical dataset were much more varied than those in our
agent-based models (Fig. 3). Mean focus in real groups was 0.53 (range −0.15 to 0.95) and mean
position was 0.34 (range−0.04 to 0.65). These values were not strongly associated with phylogenetic
relatedness. This divergence between expected focus and position values from simulated data and
the real values from empirical datasets shows that the simple downward heuristic could only capture
part of the decisions that animals make in the real world.
Group-level rules structuring aggression
The majority of animal social groups had clearly detectable strategies that structured aggression
(Fig. 3). Almost all groups (94% of groups, N = 162) could be categorized without ambiguity to one
of three main aggression strategies: downward heuristic (aggress against lower-ranked individuals
indiscriminately, 65% of groups), close competitors (preferentially aggress against those ranked
slightly below themselves, 16% of groups), or bullying (preferentially aggress against those ranked
far below themselves, 13% of groups). Only 10 groups had less defined strategies, and of these,
only 5 (3%) were classified as undefined.
We found no evidence that social group size affected which strategy a group followed. Median group
size was similar across all three strategy types (Fig. A2.2) and misclassification rates for predicting
strategy type by social group size (via multinomial regression) were high (> 80%).
We also found no evidence that the conditions under which groups were sampled (whether the
group was captive or wild) affected observed values of focus or position, or which strategy type
the group followed. Focus and position values were similar in wild and captive groups, and both
wild and captive groups had similar proportions of strategy types (Fig. A2.3). Misclassification
rates for predicting strategy type by social group size and conditions (via multinomial regression)
were high (85%). At the order level, not enough groups from the same orders were sampled in
both wild and captivity to make any general conclusions about whether living conditions, and
captivity in particular, affected the chances of a group using a particular strategy in combination
with phylogenetic relatedness (Fig. A2.4).
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Figure 3: Focus and position values for observed social groups, colored by strategy assignment.
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Phylogenetic signal
All three well-defined strategies occurred in orders across the range in the dataset (Fig. 4). We
found no evidence for phylogenetic signal for any of the three strategy types. Pagel’s λ, which
is a measure of the extent of phylogenetic signal [33, 34], was < 0.000001 in all cases, indicating
that essentially no phylogenetic signal was present and that use of strategies used evolved largely
independent of the phylogeny. A chi-squared likelihood test of the λ transformed tree compared to
the real phylogenetic tree found no statistical difference between the two (p = 1) for each of the
three strategies, providing further evidence for a lack of phylogenetic signal. Finally, an ancestral
state reconstruction of each strategy type showed no clear evolutionary pattern (Fig. 5, A2.5, A2.6).
Where a single species had multiple independent social groups in our dataset, we found that different
groups of the same species often followed different strategies rather than a single consistent strategy.
For the 32 species for which two or more groups had pure detectable strategies (either downward
heuristic, pure close competitors, or pure bullying), 53% of species had groups that followed more
than one strategy (Fig. 6). For example, yellow baboons were evenly split between 5 groups
which used a basic downward heuristic and 5 groups that used the more complex close competitors
strategy. Three species, African elephants, Harris’s sparrows, and horses, had groups that followed
all three pure strategies.
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Figure 4: Strategy types are not phylogenetically restricted to particular orders nor affected by
the size of social groups.
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Discussion
The study of dominance hierarchies in animal groups is now nearly a century old. Recent research
has found strikingly similar patterns in micro-structural elements of aggression networks across a
wide range of species [22], but the reasons for this widespread similarity have remained unclear.
This paper has taken a complementary approach by addressing hierarchical structures from a
macro-structural perspective. Instead of looking at the building blocks of hierarchies, we looked at
the aggression rules that structure decisions behind them. These rules represent strategies based
on feedback from group-level social facts, not just network structure, and are based on detecting
the use of rank-based social information. Instead of looking for “local” patterns involving a small
number of individuals, in other words, we look for the influence of the global pattern on interactions.
We developed new methods to detect and categorize the strategies that structure within-group
aggression and conflict, detectable even in sparse data because they are followed by the majority
of individuals in the group. Each strategy relies on different kinds of social information, and the
existence and strength of the consensus strategies we detect indicates that the majority of the
individuals in the social group have access to that information.
Our methods enable us to assay historical datasets to detect the rules that guide behavioral decisions
within dominance structures and to develop a taxonomy of social systems using different types of
information to structure aggression. Many groups have aggression structures consistent with the
downward heuristic, the most basic dominance hierarchy rule, but some groups use multi-faceted
strategies such as preferentially aggresing against close competitors or bullying bottom-ranked
animals. We detected all three strategy types across most of the orders in our dataset and found
that the strategies employed by specific social groups could vary even within species.
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Figure 5: Ancestral state reconstruction of close competitor strategy
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Figure 6: Occurrence of pure strategies by species with multiple social groups. Sorted by number
of groups, then strategy, then alphabetically
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Social information and rank-based strategies
These results about the strategies animals use to structure their interactions provide insight into
the types and extent of social information that underlie social decision-making. The presence of a
rank-informed aggression strategy in a group is evidence that individuals in the group are capable
of perceiving the information needed to use that strategy. However, the use of a strategy in a
particular group is not necessarily an indication of whether that strategy is commonly used by
other groups of the same species, nor is it indicative of a particular cognitive method individuals
use to manage the information needed to achieve those strategies. Similarly, not finding evidence
for a particular rank-informed strategy in any one group cannot be used to determine whether the
rank information is present but not being used, or whether, conversely, the animals themselves
are incapable of synthesizing the type of information necessary to use the strategy. As such,
it is important to note that the absence of a rank-based strategy cannot be used as a positive
confirmation that a species is unable or unwilling to use a particular rank-based strategy.
While models can make predictions about what types of information underlie sociality, in-depth
understanding of the cognitive abilities of the species, including its memory, and recognition and
perceptive abilities, are needed to fully understand how information is used, what information is
present, how it is encoded, and what kinds of cognition underlie the entire process. For species
that have more detailed information about rank and use a close competitors or bullying strategy,
priorities for future research on these species will be to differentiate between cases where individuals
can follow a more information-rich strategy via a simple underlying rule that allows easy detection
of relative rank differences, or when the ability to use rank information is based instead on more
cognitively demanding methods that require the recognition of particular individuals and memories
of past outcomes. Manipulative experiments are needed in order to differentiate the types of
processes that generate and store information in high-information social groups. Experiments are
critical in distinguishing between social groups where information is contained in more or less
cognitively-demanding ways, and will allow us to begin to identify those species that could have
more complex social assessment and memory abilities than is commonly assumed.
Potential plasticity of social strategies
We have found that groups of the same species can exhibit different macro-level strategies. While
certain kinds of conflict can be associated with phylogenetic relatedness (e.g. the occurrence of letal
violence in mammals, [35]), it appears that the strategies that a species deploys have as much vari-
ance within clades as they do between them. The variability we find in strategy use within species
shows that these social rules should be thought of as facts about particular groups, rather than rigid
species-level characteristics. Factors such as resource availability and distribution, environmentally-
mediated constraints, and direct environmental influences on physiology can all result in changes to
individual aggression and group dominance structure (reviewed in [36]). These changes may shift
which aggression strategy is optimal under new social, environmental, or ecological conditions. A
species that is able to respond to changes in conditions by altering its aggression strategy may
be more successful than a more socially-rigid species. Temporal shifts in the behaviors underlying
dominance interactions have been documented in human groups where dominance strategies and
the behaviors used to mediate dominance interactions change with age [4]. Dominance strategies
can even change over time within the same social group, as we previously documented in aggres-
sion in parakeets [17]. Our results support these earlier conclusions that sociality can vary within
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a single species. Combined, these results suggest that experimental work on the ontogeny of dom-
inance hierarchies, social information, and aggression strategies is needed to fully understand the
conditions under which an information-based strategy, like rank-focused aggression, would emerge
and be used in social groups.
Variability in strategy use, or social plasticity, has a further implication. One way that aggression
strategies could emerge is through adaptive responses to local conditions. Once established, these
strategies could be learned by new individuals joining the group. If individuals learn these strategies
from each other, and the strategies persist in groups due to social learning, aggression strategies
could represent “cultures of aggression”, where the type of aggression strategy in use in a group
may be a somewhat arbitrary outcome of prior conditions frozen in by cultural learning. This kind
of culturally-based inertia may lead to a divergence between actual and optimal behavior, and may
indicate that the social system is susceptible to complex nonlinear dynamics and potentially to
social tipping points [37].
Insight into social cognition and social complexity
A fundamental question in animal behavior is how much animals “know” about their social worlds,
and how much and what type of social information they use as a basis in their decision-making
processes. Just as intelligence appears to have evolved independently in different clades [38], social
complexity appears to have multiple, independent evolutionary origins. Approaches to studying
animal social complexity often attempt to indirectly quantify the extent of social information in
social groups, usually through various summary measures such as group size (e.g., Ref. [39, 40]),
network size (e.g., Ref. [41]), or the number or diversity of different types of relationships (e.g.,
Ref. [42, 43]). Many of these methods seek to understand how much animals know about their social
worlds, and recent work has advocated explicitly quantifying social information when attempting
to assess social complexity [42]. However, while we can quantify many aspects of social structure,
without additional experimental manipulation (e.g. [44, 45]) it has not previously been possible
to determine the extent of information that individuals in groups have of their social worlds. In
broader comparisons, it has also been difficult to find a way to quantify social information in a
manner that is both feasible and generalizable enough to be used in a wide range of species, as
social interactions may differ in their salience and biological meaningfulness across species. By
taking a top-down rank-informed approach to social information in our work, we avoid some of
these difficulties.
The evidence we found for social information and rank-focused aggressive behavior across the
animal kingdom suggests that the question of what animals know about their social worlds should
be thought of in two parts: first, “how much do they know?”; second, “how do they know it?”
Our approach measures the extent and use of social information but cannot detect how that in-
formation is encoded. This is an important distinction because a broad range of mechanisms and
processes may lead to the emergence of similar social structures that individuals can use to obtain
and act on social information. Information can be encoded in social groups that rely on both cog-
nitive mechanisms such as memory and pattern recognition as well as non-cognitive mechanisms
such as physiological shifts or alterations in observable signals. Given the widespread nature of
social information and its use in the animal kingdom, why don’t all species use a simple cue or
rule-of-thumb to infer their own rank and the rank of others in their group? Many species do, in
fact, use these simpler methods, and have strongly size-based hierarchies which would allow rank
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differences to be visible if the individuals could discriminate among these signal differences. But
some species do not seem to use these simple solutions to detecting rank differences among individ-
uals. In previous work with monk parakeets for example, we have not found any easily-observable
characteristic that is strongly correlated with rank. Instead, we have found indications that rank
knowledge in these groups forms through memory and processing of social interactions, rather than
a directly correlative signal [17]. In other systems, groups may dynamically alter the complexity of
the social rule they follow. Recent evidence from experiments with sparrows shows that individuals
only use simple rules when interacting with strangers but switch to rely on individual recognition
and memory of past interactions when interacting with known individuals [15]. This kind of change
represents a shift from what appears to be a simple rule to one that appears more cognitively
demanding. The existence of high levels of within-species diversity in strategy usage also suggests
that more flexible, cognitive schema are in play, rather than hard-coded mechanisms that depend
on physical characteristics.
In our analyses, none of the social strategies we detected were phylogenetically restricted to par-
ticular orders. This provides evidence that similar levels of social knowledge could emerge through
convergent evolution even if the underlying methods animals use to process or store social in-
formation and make aggression decisions differ. Without perception, recognition, inference, and
knowledge, simpler rules based on cues or less cognitively demanding signals may be able to explain
interaction patterns and hierarchical organization. Without inference to fill in missing information
or create new summaries of social information, group social interactions and resulting social network
structure may simply be complicated, rather than complex.
Conclusion
Our analysis has provided a social assay to back-infer how much information animals have about
their social worlds, based on their decisions about how to interact with each other. Using these new
tools, researchers now categorize groups into a taxonomy of social strategies, where the patterns of
aggression in each strategy type are based on different types of social information.
The broad applicability of our quantitative tools allows provides new opportunities to quantify the
evolution of social structure across divergent taxa. Our global approach to detecting and studying
social knowledge can be used to gain insight into social complexity in groups across many different
types of social structures. This is especially important in understanding the conditions under which
complex sociality, based on social information, should emerge. Treating social complexity as an
emergent property of the group provides a cleaner framework for comparing complexity both within
and between species. The information contained in the interactions is complementary to the overall
social network structure; our results show that species with different social systems and network
structures can have similar levels of complexity.
The tractability and wide applicability of our approach enables comparative analyses that can
provide a better understanding of the evolutionary patterns underlying the distribution of social
processing skills and complex sociality across taxa. Previous analyses have often simplified many
of the driving features of social complexity [39, 40], or were restricted to closely related species,
e.g. within primates [46]. Using our approach, we are now able to compare a broad range of
species using a high-level summary of group behavior which enables us to more directly compare
the presence and use of social knowledge, and the potential for social cognition, in these groups.
Combined with recent results from empirical work and an understanding of the cognitive abilities of
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species, our approach provides new opportunities to investigate the extent of rank-based information
encoded in societies across species, compare the evolution of the use of social information, and better
understand the effect of social information on individual behavior in within-group conflict.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: the  Regularization Term for the measurement of PageRank in
Animal Conflict
A basic step in the calculation of focus and average peak position is the estimation of the transition
matrix, Tij , a collection of probabilities, from the data. The “naive” way to estimate a probability
of an event occurring from a finite number of observations is
p˜ =
ni
N
. (8)
While attractive in its simplicity, this estimator has a number of problems (see Ref. [47]); a Bayesian
analysis leads to the correction
pˆ =
ni + 
N +m
, (9)
where m is the number of event types, and  a regularization parameter (sometimes called a
“teleportation term”). When  is equal to unity, we have Laplace’s rule; more generally, we can
think of  as parametrising a Dirichlet distribution that serves as the prior for the possible values
of the underlying probabilities p [48, 49].
In the case we have here, Tij is the estimate of the probability that i aggress against j; by stipulation,
the individual i can not aggress against itself. We can then adapt equation 9 to the estimate of the
probability distributions in the matrix Tij .
How do we choose ? A natural way to do so is to learn  from the data itself; we do so here
using k-fold cross validation, with k set to five. For each dataset, in other words, we compute the
probabilities Tij , for some particular choice of , based on a randomly chosen sample of only 4/5
of the data. We then compute the log-probability per data-point of the remaining “held out” 1/5
of the data, nij , using those estimated Tijs,
L() =
1
Nh
N∑
i,j=1
nij log Tij(), (10)
where Nh is the number of observations in the held-out set (i.e., 1/5 of the total number of
observations). In words, L() is how well that particular choice of  “predicts” the held-out data;
the optimal choice of  is that which best predicts.
We repeat this process many times, choosing a different hold-out set each time, to get an estimate
of the average log-probability of the held-out data. We then choose  to maximize this average of
L(). Fig. A1.1 shows an example of this process for the data of Ref. [50]. The peak of this function
allows us to pick the optimal epsilon to be around 0.3 for this dataset, although values between
0.2 and 0.6 are largely indistinguishable. Fig. A1.2 shows a scatter plot of the L-maximizing  for
all 161 aggression matrices in our data, as a function of both total number of observations, and
number of individuals.
We find that most matrices have optimal values of  between 0.1 and 1.0, and that there is no
strong correlation between optimal  and system size or total number of observations. The average
value of epsilon across all datasets is 0.694.
1
Little hinges on the exact value of ; indeed, using the average value in place of the optimal
choice for any particular dataset leads to an average (absolute value) shift in the focus measure of
only 0.027, and in the average peak position of only 0.017; over our data, the two choices have a
Pearson correlation of 0.95 (Focus) and 0.97 (Average Peak Position). Since finding the optimal
 is computationally intensive, and since the final results are largely insensitive to this choice, we
suggest the average value, 0.694, is appropriate for ordinary use, and (for simplicity) we present
our analyses here using this choice.
Figure A1.1: Determining optimal  through k-fold cross validation; an example of equation 10
applied to the data of Ref. [50]. An  value of approximately 0.3, in this case, best predicts held-out
data, but a range of  values between 0.1 and 1 perform similarly well.
Figure A1.2: A scatter plot of optimal epsilons found using equation 10, as a function of total
number of observations (left), and total number of individuals in the data (right). The optimal
value shows no strong trends with either variable; the average optimal value for  is 0.694 and we
use this for simplicity in the calculations in the main text.
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Appendix 2: Effect of group conditions and evolutionary history on dominance
hierarchy characteristics and aggression strategies
Figure A2.1: Focus, position, and strategy type for wild and captive groups
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Figure A2.2: Social group size and strategy type. Using groups with well-defined aggression
strategies, we found no evidence that social group size affected which strategy was used in a group.
Multinomial logistic regression showed that training based on 75% of the real data resulted in
miscategorization rates of 83%. The beanplots show group size distributions as density shapes,
where the dotted line indicates median group size across all three strategies, the thicker black lines
indicate median group size for each strategy type, and the thinner horizontal lines indicate the
frequency of each social group size in the sample.
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Figure A2.3: Social group size and strategy type by condition. Using groups with well-defined
aggression strategies, we found no evidence that the combination of social group size and condi-
tion (captive vs. wild groups) affected which strategy was used in a group. Multinomial logistic
regression showed that training based on 75% of the real data resulted in miscategorization rates
of 85%. The beanplots show group size distributions as density shapes, where the dotted line indi-
cates median group size across all three strategies and conditions, the thicker black lines indicate
median group size for each strategy type under each condition (captive vs. wild), and the thinner
horizontal lines indicate the frequency of each social group size in the sample.
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Figure A2.4: Group size and strategy type for wild and captive groups by Order
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Figure A2.5: Ancestral state reconstruction, downward heuristic. Presence = red, absence =
grey.
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Figure A2.6: Ancestral state reconstruction, bullying strategy. Presence = red, absence = grey.
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